ABSTRACT Phishing is one of the most harmful social engineering techniques to subdue end users where threat actors find a chance to gain access to critical information systems. A common approach in phishing is through the use of e-mail communication with an embedded hyperlink. The detection and mitigation of phishing attacks are a grand challenge due to the complexity of current phishing attacks. Existing techniques are often too time consuming to be used in the real world in terms of detection and mitigation time. Likewise, they employ static detection rules that are not effective in the real world due to the dynamics of phishing attacks. In this paper, we present PhishLimiter, a new detection and mitigation approach, where we first propose a new technique for deep packet inspection (DPI) and then leverage it with software-defined networking (SDN) to identify phishing activities through e-mail and web-based communication. The proposed DPI approach consists of two components: phishing signature classification and real-time DPI. Based on the programmability of SDN, we develop the store and forward mode and the forward and inspect mode to the direct network traffic by using an artificial neural network model to classify phishing attack signatures and design the real-time DPI so that PhishLimiter can flexibly address the dynamics of phishing attacks in the real world. PhishLimiter also provides better network traffic management for containing phishing attacks since it has the global view of a network through SDN. Furthermore, we evaluate PhishLimiter using a real-world testbed environment and data sets consisting of real-world email with embedded links. Our extensive experimental study shows that PhishLimiter provides an effective and efficient solution to deter malicious activities.
I. INTRODUCTION
Amongst a daunting pile of unread e-mail messages lies a precarious hyper link to a malicious website, waiting for a user's click. This message sent by a threat actor is commonly known as phishing, where the threat actor waits for the end user to click on such a link to potentially compromise an organization or computing system. Many organizations adopt Security Education Training Awareness (SETA) programs to inform end users to be more cautious with suspicious e-mails, but many end users fail to adhere to such policies that lead to potential data loss. Phishing has become one of the most deadly attacks. There have been numerous approaches to thwarting phishing attacks from an infrastructure viewpoint such as Phishnet [1] , lexical-based online learning [2] , and a proactive phishing identification approach [3] . Additionally, traditional methods to deter phishing e-mails are through the use of vendor-based solutions such as Barracuda Email Security Gateway [4] and Symantec Messaging Gateway [5] , but both systems require e-mail traffic redirection to each security appliance. Although vendor solutions may identify phishing e-mails, they do not prevent an end user from clicking on a malicious link within a flagged e-mail that may lead to compromising a computing system. To deter such concerns, ones propose a variety of Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) and Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS) approaches to identifying and deterring phishing e-mails, but they lack feasibility or cannot be used when e-mail communication becomes encrypted, which is typically done nowadays.
Moreover, IDS and IPS commonly use static string matching techniques, so existing solutions present a challenge for new phishing attacks that were not identified previously. Furthermore, the use of an IDS heavily depends on the response time (alert) of the detection mechanism to determine adverse behaviors. One concern of such response time is when a user clicks on a hyperlink leading to compromising a system before an alert can be raised in addition to mitigation attempts using an IPS. To combat such challenges, we present PhishLimiter, a new detection, and mitigation approach using Software-Defined Networking (SDN) to identify adverse phishing behaviors. PhishLimiter leverages the programmability of SDN [6] , [7] to combat phishing attack dynamics. That is, phishing attacks are identified using a variety of existing detection techniques such as threat signature approaches, but these techniques have a limited capability for adapting to new threats, and require administrative configuration manipulation. PhishLimiter utilizes an Artificial Neural Network (ANN) model to adjust to phishing attacks such that PhishLimiter can do self-training for new threat advancement and detection via the dynamic change on the flow table of an SDN controller.
Specifically, in PhishLimiter, we propose a Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) approach by using the two modes: Store and Forward (SF) and a Forward and Inspect (FI) on SDN switching devices running Open vSwitch (OVS) [6] , [8] , [9] . In the proposed detection approach, we compute and maintain the score of each incoming network packet called the PhishLimiter Score (PLS) and an OVS score (a predefined threshold on the OVS) where either SF or FI is employed based on a comparison of these two scores. The PhishLimiter score is increased or decreased based on the placement of each packet in the modes and the detection of a phishing attack. Once a particular network flow has a PLS value below the predefined threshold, the traffic redirection will be placed through FI, a reduced delay network path. At the initialization of a network flow, all traffic begins with a network link with SF restrictions and then either remain in SF or FI depending on the PLS value and the OVS score. We further analyze the behavior of the PLS. To identify phishing threats, we develop an ANN classification from a series of datasets [10] to evaluate incoming traffic communication in SDN. Moreover, we develop an ANN classifier based on numerous phishing features outlined by Hasan [11] . We integrate the ANN classifier and these features into the proposed detection approach in PhishLimiter.
To summarize, we make the following contributions in this research:
• We design PhishLimiter, a new dynamic phishing detection and mitigation approach using SDN. It utilizes the programmability of SDN to address the dynamics of phishing attacks that cannot be handled in existing IDPS solutions such as SNORT [12] and BRO [13] . PhishLimiter also provides better network traffic management as it has the global view of a network due to SDN. We examine a variety of phishing detection techniques such as neural network and machine learning methods and identify the ANN classification technique to be used in this research due to its accuracy where we develop a highly accurate ANN model suitable to PhishLimiter. Moreover, we identify and implement a series of phishing features using Global Environment for Network Innovation (GENI) [14] , a real-world testbed environment.
• We analytically study the stability and robustness of PhishLimiter. We also experimentally examine it on GENI for its effectiveness and efficiency in the real world. Specifically, our experimental evaluation demonstrates the effectiveness of PhishLimiter by using various real-world datasets and extensively evaluate a mix variation using the dynamic approach presented through an ANN model on GENI. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II provides the background and challenges of this research. In Section III, we present the threat model and assumption of this research. Section IV outlines the methodology for our approach to the research problem through the discussion of the architectural design of PhishLimiter. Section V presents the experiment results for the evaluation of PhishLimiter. In Section VI, we provide the related work of this research. Section VII concludes our study with future work.
II. BACKGROUND AND RESEARCH CHALLENGES
In this section, we first describe research background and then identify research challenges.
A. PHISHING DETECTION AND MITIGATION BACKGROUND
Phishing attacks and its variant subtypes such as spear phishing and whaling are common threats to an enterprise organization [15] - [17] . Most existing phishing detection techniques are browser-based. The application layer techniques heavily rely on users' understanding and education on phishing attacks. Unfortunately, many people do not realize how sophisticated phishing attacks can be [18] . Besides the application layer, the detection and mitigation of such attacks are very difficult challenges to address due to the complexity of attack signatures in addition to IDS/IPS timing requirements [19] . A phishing attack may have already compromised a computing device before detection alerts are raised and mitigation is done. Traditional mediums for phishing attacks are employed through e-mail and web communication [20] , [21] . Such communication can be identified using techniques such as proxy services, firewall applications, and IDS/IPS solutions. Encrypted communication such as SMTPS and HTTPS creates a challenge for traffic identification due to the lack of the appropriate private key to decrypt such messages [22] . Common techniques to solve such encryption problems are through the use of an organization certification authority and combination of the certification authority with a proxy service. Additionally, IDS/IPS solutions traditionally utilize static string matching techniques as the heuristic approach to determine malicious activities, but they lack in identifying VOLUME 6, 2018 unknown or new threats. That is, they cannot address the dynamics of phishing attacks. Lastly, a compromised device through phishing attacks can be catastrophic for an organization due to confidential data loss. Other techniques to prevent such a threat are through the uses of Data Loss Prevention (DLP) services and Host Intrusion Detection Systems (HIDS), but they heavily rely on client-side resources to mitigate phishing attempts.
B. SOFTWARE DEFINED NETWORKING (SDN)
SDN is an emerging networking structure that aims to overcome limitations of legacy networks. The centralized management of SDN guarantees consistent policy enforcement, better scalability, holistic visibility and flex programmable network function [6] , [7] , [23] . PhishLimiter leverages the programmability and global view of a network to defense phishing attacks.
C. RESEARCH CHALLENGES
Although detection and mitigation techniques are traditional approaches to deter such threat, there are two major challenges as follows.
1) MITIGATION TIME
Timing is a key concern in thwarting threat actors/attackers. The time in which an information security solution prevents, deters, or mitigates a phishing attack is critical to protecting an end-user. Varying from user to user, a notification of a new e-mail message may trigger an immediate response from the end user such that they may open the message and click on the various attachments and links [24] . This timing is critical for a mitigation solution as the response time may be too late for the emerging threat and the targeted computing system may be compromised.
2) NETWORK PERFORMANCE
Using a proxy service in traditional inspection provides the ability for e-mail and web traffic communication to be carefully inspected and forwarded in a timely manner. One concern of the proxy service approach is the inspection time/delay that is defined as the time to inspect a URL through PhishLimiter from the beginning to the end as the priority and urgency of messages are not considered in this approach. To better curtail for urgency, inspection time needs to be minimized to handle any traffic type for network communication optimization.
Mitigation time is critical in the responsive timing to emerging phishing attacks. In the first challenge, we want to minimize this delay such that when a threat occurs, mitigation is immediately executed towards existing and new network communication originating from the attacker. Additionally, when alerts are raise for multiple alerts, a queue should not be established to mitigate each threat and multithreading would be required for both inspection and mitigation purposes [25] - [28] .
Network performance is a critical aspect when in-line security techniques are introduced. Moreover, using an IPS solution may degrade network performance due to the time needed to inspect traffic. Such a concern is typical in the use of a proxy service or other in-line solutions and to address such challenge, detection time reduction is needed where detection time is defined as the time to inspect a URL through PhishLimiter from the beginning to the point when an alert is raised. PhishLimiter has two-type inspection modes: SF and FI, for addressing this matter. Detection time is thank to the time in SF mode, in particular. As a network stream enters our PhishLimiter solution in SF mode, network traffic is stored in memory, inspected, and forwarded to the appropriate destination if deemed non-threatening. In each stage of SF mode, detection time presents a challenge in SF buffers.
SF Buffer: A critical aspect to SF is the storing feature of a network packet. A network stream consists of a variety of different packet types and size. One concern to SF is the buffer to hold each packet while traffic inspection is awaited. Traditional security solutions [4] and [5] provide various specifications such as packets per second (pps) for an IPS solution to examine each network packet. Within the SF mode, a pps metric would be rated for performance purposes.
III. THREAT MODEL AND ASSUMPTIONS
Adverse threat actors can utilize numerous approaches in establishing a phishing campaign. As an organization grows in personnel and size, the potential risk of a successful phishing attack increases. Many organizations utilize SETA programs to establish end user awareness to reduce risk. Phishing attacks' main catalyst is through the use of e-mail communication, and such approach significantly relies on the capabilities of an end user. The results of a successful phishing attack can be quite detrimental regarding data loss, compromised accounts, and remote code execution techniques. This research focuses on phishing attacks from e-mail communications from the perspective of networking equipment. Network communication is the main focus of this study and that inclinations and skill sets of end users' are left out. It assumed that all network devices, end points, and software services are secure. Additionally, the content of the e-mail communication are safe concerning application crashing techniques such as type confusion, null pointer exceptions, and use after free bugs. Furthermore, all e-mail accounts are safe, and e-mail communication does not employ message key encryption techniques such as Pretty Good Privacy (PGP).
IV. DESIGN
This section starts with the framework of PhishLimiter and then describe its architectural design in detail.
A. THE FRAMEWORK OF PHISHLIMITER
To address phishing attacks, we propose our new solution, PhishLimiter, to identify and mitigate adverse traffic communication. SDN is an emerging technology that separates its control plane from its data plane for better traffic management. PhishLimiter leverages the programmability and global view of a network to detect and mitigate phishing attacks. It utilizes a two-type inspection approach of SF and FI where we consider the two SF/FI path as slow or fast lanes, respectively. To clarify our approach, Figure 1 gives the framework of PhishLimiter where it describes two clients (CLI) communicating with one another through the fast lane (FI) whereas the attacker (ATK) will communicate over the slow lane approach (SF), where PhishLimiter facilitates such communication and drops phishing traffic. The communication occurs over a series of SDN switches using Open vSwitch (OVS) [9] , [29] , [30] . The following describes the two lanes of network traffic for PhishLimiter.
1) STORE AND FORWARD (SLOW LANE)
Using the SF approach, when a packet enters a switch, the information is held, inspected, and classified for analysis. If the analysis of a packet has resulted in no malicious intent, then the information is forwarded to the respective destination. If the traffic is considered malicious, then the packet is dropped at the switch, and therefore the end device is protected. Due to the hold procedure of the SF approach, delay in network traffic is visible on the switching device, and thus the end device will show increased latency and performance degradation concerning the network communication.
2) FORWARD AND INSPECT (FAST LANE)
In the FI approach, we identify this routing path as the fast lane for when traffic enters such switching device, it is immediately forwarded to the destination, and a copy of the information is temporarily stored for inspection. Unlike the SF approach, traffic is not held at the switching device, and therefore minimal delay is presented in this routing path. One concern of this approach is that if a phishing attack were to be sent through an FI path, and the end user was to execute the threat, it may be too late for detection and mitigation as they already occur.
B. THE DETAILED DESIGN OF PHISHLIMITER
Although network communication can traverse through either the SF or FI lane, the deciding factor to such a choice is through a trustworthiness system we build and implement it as PhishLimiter Score (s). Moreover, each SDN flow has 
r ← FeatureExtractorClassifier(pkt) 11: if r = 1 then 12: move pkt to quarantine area 13 :
update s j for controller 15: else 16 :
update s j for controller 18: Encrypt pkt Encrypt pkt 23: Forward packet 24 :
r ←FeatureExtractorClassifier(pkt) 26: if r = 1 then 27:
update s j for controller 29: move pkt to quarantine area 30 :
update s j for controller 33: Encrypt pkt 34: Forward Packet 35: endif 36: endif a s value based upon their source of either an IP address or interface. For our evaluation, we examine PhishLimiter using IP addresses, but this parameter can be set by an administrator for more refinement if near clients and not border router devices. update PLS based on feature extractor and classifier, when the initial PLS is greater than the threshold. The result means the packet is processed in the SF lane. On the other hand, from lines 22 to 34, the algorithm shows how the PLS is updated in the FI lane. We now illustrate the detail process as follows. As expressed, let F be an SDN flow consisting of packets and pkt be a packet within F such that pkt ∈ F. When new network communication occurs (1) , F is inserted to the OVS by Floodlight. PhishLimiter examines (2) if F has been seen before.
To be concise, PhishLimiter maintains an internal database of data pertaining to F such as source and destination IP addresses in conjunction with a s value (we will show that PhishLimiter is stable in next section, so the selection of the initial value of s will not affect the performance of PhishLimiter). Furthermore, we utilize this technique to maintain a history record of s values for PhishLimiter. Let s be a PLS value and s j−1 be the PLS value for packet j − 1 where j ≥ 1. When F has been seen before, we retrieve s j−1 from an internal database ω within FloodLight. When F is new, then we set s j−1 to be an initial value. Let s ovs be a threshold value for PhishLimiter in determining whether F should be placed in SF or FI, where s ovs is predefined by the OVS. We further compare s j−1 to s ovs , i.e., s j−1 > s ovs ? as denoted (3) . If s j−1 > s ovs , then F will be placed in SF mode and viceversa if s j−1 ≤ s ovs .
Case 1: Within SF, packet pkt is placed in a buffer and undergoes detection for malicious activities as denoted in (4a) and (5a), respectively. Under the examination of pkt through our ANN approach, if pkt is phishing, then we drop, and forward if it is not as denoted in (6a). We update s j−1 and compare again for the next pkt as denoted in (7) and (3), respectively.
Case 2: Under the FI mode (4b), pkt is forwarded to the destination and copied for inspection in (5b). Comparatively, under the FI mode, the copied pkt is dropped once PhishLimiter determines if it has malicious intent or not in (6b). We continue both processes of updating (7) for s j and comparing s j > s ovs for each new incoming packet.
Lastly, in order to change the direction of F we execute REpresentational State Transfer Application Programming Interfaces (REST API) procedural calls within Floodlight as denoted in (8) where we utilize the Static Entry Pusher module to manipulate flow traffic. For convenience, Table 1 summarizes the above notation, symbols, and abbreviations for PhishLimiter and Table 2 gives test cases studied in this paper.
1) PHISHING CLASSIFICATION AND FEATURE EXTRACTION
PhishLimiter evaluates pkt to identify malicious intent through careful analysis using a series of classification and feature extraction techniques during the inspection process and developed using ANN. To clarify, we identify phishing attacks using a collection of features and characteristics defined by Hassan [11] to determine the intent of pkt. We describe our feature extraction approaches in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Feature Extractor Algorithm
Input pl, plaintext decrypted from crypto module. URLregex, detction regex.
Output Fv, list of formated feature vector for classifier. 
if url in cache then 5: return cache result 6:
whtml ← url.request() 8: udns ← url.requestdns() classify(Fv) 14: EndFor Using PhishLimiter, we identify potential phishing attacks within layer 7 of the OSI model and utilize DPI as our approach to identify each payload using our feature extractor. Our phishing deterrence scheme is found on the detection of URLs and web-based codes such as HTML and Javascript within the payload of pkt. We apply feature extraction to pkt to determine if there is any phishing behavior.
To provide clarity, we give the structure of the proposed FEC model in Figure 3 . Our FEC evaluates each URL in a packet as an input in order to identify the intent. We further classify typical phishing features (see Mohammad et al. [31] ). Based on such information, a vector [x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ] is crafted and sent to the ANN classifier where n is the number of features. We have extensively trained and tested numerous datasets to build an efficient and accurate ANN model for PhishLimiter. To be concise, we describe each phishing classification as follows.
a: FEATURE EXTRACTOR
Using PhishLimiter, it is necessary to obtain the various identifying markers for a given e-mail communication stream. In our scheme, the feature extractor obtains URLs and webbased code as an input value, and outputs a vector that consist of thirty features. Algorithm 2 describes how the feature extractor works. The feature extractor takes plaintext packet payload pl as an input. It outputs the formative feature vectors for an ANN classifier. Thus, the first step described in line 1 is for finding all the URLs in the input message. For each URL, a 30-dimension vector is constructed based on 3 types of data listed here. Since there are a lot of duplicated URLs during the process of inspecting network traffic, we design a cache module to hold all the historical data. So, if the URL is found in the cache, the feature extractor will automatically return without querying the HTML and DNA data.
URL-Based Features: Features 1 through 13 contain the phishing characteristics of URL. For example, feature 1 is to detect whether the URL uses an IP address as the domain name. Feature 2 is to check whether the URL hides the suspicious part of a long text. Feature 3 is to detect whether URL shortening services is deployed. This group of features distinguishes phishing threats from common text-based websites. It is important to note that an adversary might be able to easily evade URL detection mechanisms that rely only on URL obfuscation-based features [32] .
HTML-Based Features: Features 14 to 23 is used to detect the anomaly of HTML and JavaScript code. These features include URL Request, links in <META>, <SCRIPT>, and <LINK> tags; server form handlers, website forwarders, status bar customization, disabling right click, etc. These web page anomalies are usually marked as phishing characteristics in reported phishing attacks [33] .
Domain-Based Features: Features 24 to 30 identifies domain information from the URL. These features often rely on external databases such as WHOIS, Alexa database, Google Index, and PhishTank. We query the age of a domain using DNS records, website traffic rankings, Google indexing, hyperlinks pointing to the domain, and statistical reports based on features from PhishTank [34] .
Algorithm 3 ANN Classifier Algorithm
Input 
return −1 %It is corresponding to no phishing. 9: else 10: return 1 %It is corresponding to phishing.
b: ANN CLASSIFIER
As described above, we have extensively studied various classification approaches and numerous datasets in this research. For example, we have studied various machine learning classifiers on the phishing datasets in the VOLUME 6, 2018 UCI Machine Learning Repository [35] . We have extensively tested Support Vector Machines(SVM), J48 trees, NaiveBayes, and Logistic regression [36] - [38] .
As shown in Section V, Figures 4 and 5 depict the overall accuracies of these methods ranging from 95.02% to 97.16%. (See its detailed experimental setup in Section V.) Specifically, J48, SVM, Logistic regression and Naive Bayes provide the mean accuracies of 97.16%, 95.85%, 95.67%, and 95.02%, respectively. However, ANN model shows an average accuracy of 98.39%, which ranges from 97.92% to 99.12% based on the phishing link proportion of the data. As phishing is a serious attack, improving the accuracy of classification become vital and necessary. Thus, we choose an ANN model as our classifier for phishing. Algorithm 3 shows how ANN works based on our constructed model parameters w and b in line 1. After the model is loaded, the input feature vector is attached to the output matrix as the first layer. In every loop of computation in line 4, the result will use matrix multiplication to multiply weights matrix w with previous layer result and then add the bias b. The resulting value is applied to a sigmoid function used as the next layers input. By adjusting the size of the layer, we output only one probability defined as L. When L < 0.5, the algorithm returns −1 and labels this URL as non phishing; otherwise, the algorithm returns 1 as a phishing result.
In order to obtain the best ANN model, we test a different model with different layers to see which one gives us the best accuracy. These models include: (1) 1 layer with out hidden layer; (2) two layers with 10, and 1 perceptrons in each layer; (3) three layers with 20, 10, and 1 perceptrons; (4) four layers with 50, 20, 10 and 1 perceptrons; (5) five layers with 100, 50, 20, 10 and 1 perceptrons; (6) six layers with 200, 100, 50, 20, 10 and 1 perceptrons. We found that the classification accuracy reaches a peak at the case of five layers with an accuracy of 98.39%. The accuracies of other models range from 94.30% to 97.74%. Moreover, we apply a 50% dropout mask on the first layer. Dropout is a simple training method that randomly drop a certain percentage of data at one layer as seen in [39] . The data of our accuracies show an average accuracy improvement from 97.03% to 98.39%, Figure 7 . In sum, we tuned a specifically good Figure 3 . That is, the ANN has 30 × 100 + 100 × 50 + 50 × 20 + 20 × 10 + 10 × 1 = 9210 weights and 5 biases. Moreover, the ANN classifier has an output (y 5,1 ), a single sigmoid function with a range from zero to one, where y 5,1 ≤ 0.5 is considered as phishing and otherwise, it is not a threat. Figure 4 in the next section shows that the proposed ANN model provides the best average accuracy of 98.39% compared to J48, SVM, Logistic regression and Naive Bayes. Therefore, our proposed ANN model is used as an classifier in this research.
2) DETECTION SIGNATURES: IDENTIFYING A URL
The identification of a URL is critical to the processes of PhishLimiter. Moreover, e-mail communication can contain numerous quantities of text and specifically a URL. As pkt enters a respective PhishLimiter inspection device, the payload needs to be examined for information. The characteristics of a URL can have numerous traits and features. We describe the characteristics of a URL in Figure 8 and provide discussion on our detection processes as follows. Using such characteristics, we implement string matching approaches using regular expressions (regex) to identify URLs in a network stream. Moreover, our analysis defines three types of regex statements we used to identify URLs within pkt as depicted in Figure 11 . The structure of a URL needs to be identified for any combination including numerous sections-specifically, parts 2 and 5 of Figure 8 . Additionally, traditional Top Level Domains (TLDs) previously allow a three letter naming convention, but has since expand to a numerous variety of combinations from two to six letters including non-english characters. This change of TLDs creates a potential area of investigation such that false positives may occur.
3) DYNAMIC CHANGE: SWITCHING DESIGN
A critical asset to PhishLimiter is the ability to change the inspection paths for a particular network flow dynamically.
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The operation of PhishLimiter relies on the capabilities of northbound REST API to change the path. SDN flows operate in directionality and that the communication channel for e-mail messages must be set in a bi-directional manner. This requirement defines that two flows are needed per e-mail session or communication stream to handle the bi-directional behavior. For the operational of PhishLimiter, if the system has determined that a particular session or channel has been identified for a lane change for SF to FI or vice-versa, two new flows are inserted to their respective switching devices, and that old flows are purged from the flow table.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
This section provides our experimental evaluation of PhishLimiter and describes various areas of performance analysis and our threat signatures for phishing attacks.
A. GENI: A REAL-WORLD TESTBED SOLUTION
To examine PhishLimiter, we employ GENI [14] for our experimental evaluation. Moreover, GENI is a heterogeneous NSF funded testbed environment with SDN capabilities. To provide clarity, Figure 12 describes our GENI topology design. Additionally, the devices in our GENI topology are virtual nodes and they have the following system resource specifications: Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2450 @ 2.10GHz with four cores, 1GB Memory, and 16 GB of hard drive space. GENI provides the ability to establish link degradations such as latency and loss. We choose to leave each network link pristine without any influences. Lastly, Floodlight utilizes numerous approaches to handling links from OVS to SF and OVS to FI. Moreover, in scenario where load balancing does not occur, flow direction is selected based on MAC-address. We modify Floodlight to insert new SDN flows to the SF path by following the architecture of PhishLimiter. Furthermore, our analysis utilizes the following versions: Open vSwitch 2.3.1, Open Flow 1.3, and Floodlight 1.2. Moreover, we propose and develop parallel/multi-thread programs to study the performance of PhishLimiter on 1, 2, and 3 cores, respectively.
B. PHISHING DATASETS
In order to train our neural network model, we utilize a repository of machine learning data sets consisting of phishing websites [35] . This dataset contains numerous phishing threats including 11,055 categorized phishing websites based on a 30-feature classification model. To evaluate our approach on protecting end users from e-mail and web-based phishing attacks, we utilize three publicly available datasets consisting of data from the real world. To be concise, the three datasets we utilize are as described as follows.
For our first dataset, we utilize the SpamAssassin project [40] as our baseline evaluation. Moreover, this dataset is composed of 4,150 legitimate e-mail communication and 1897 spam-based e-mails. Due to this consideration, we treat this dataset as normal e-mail communication. For our second dataset, we utilize PhishingCorpus [41] for its compilation of phishing e-mail communication. Moreover, this dataset provides extensive the complexity of URLs from common phishing tactics outlined in our previous classification listed in Section IV. Due to the compilation of phishing e-mail data, we treat this dataset as our threat to mitigate. To be brief, this dataset consists of 4,559 phishing e-mail messages. The last dataset we utilize in the evaluation is Phishload [42] for its raw web-based coding structures. Moreover, some e-mail communication may contain extensive HTML structural codes. In other situations, an end user may click on a URL so as to be directed to a potential phishing web page. We evaluate this dataset to examine a web-based content to determine whether this information has a malicious intent. We treat this dataset as another threatening set of information in our evaluation to examine the approaches of web-based communication. This dataset is composed of 1,185 nonphishing (normal) and 3,718 phishing URLs. To provide a realistic approach, we mix all three datasets through PhishLimiter multiple iterations in order to determine the performance and effectiveness of our proposed solution.
C. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
Using PhishLimiter for the detection and mitigation of a phishing attack is a critical asset in an IDPS solution in order to secure an organization or an end user. Moreover, the rate in which a security apparatus inspects each set of network traffic is critical in the timing with relations to raising an alert. We examine the detection time and mitigation time of PhishLimiter using our GENI nodes to measure the performance of identifying threats. Our evaluation examines the selected three-regex statements and compare them against three datasets. We demonstrate such results in Figure 14 and express a more thorough statistical analysis in Table 4 .
As shown in Table 4 , inspection time varies depending on the complexity of each URL. In the SF mode for PhishLimiter, the inspection time is an overhead where a packet cannot be forwarded before the inspection is completed. As shown in the table, the inspection time ranges from 3.2266 ms to 194.2071 ms. In the FI mode for PhishLimiter, p is forwarded to the destination in an appropriate manner where an inspection is not enforced before forwarding. That is, no overhead is added, but there is a risk to forward a malicious packet because it is not inspected before forwarding.
As shown in Figure 14 , the detection for Spoon Library regex has an overall longer inspection time than the ones for Rodney and Gruber. Furthermore, we found that Spoon Library regex detection has a slow increase of CDF from 0.65 to 1 between 50ms and 400ms, while the Gruber regex detection has a fine increase of CDF from 0.938 to 1. Therefore, the Spoon detection has a relatively longer inspection time in the Ham and Phishing Corpus datasets.
As mentioned above, the inspection time is an overhead that should be minimized such that PhishLimiter can be used in the real world. For this purpose, we further evaluate the inspection time of PhishLimiter using a different number of cores. Tables 4, 5, 6 and 7 give the time to inspect packets among different datasets. As shown in Table 5 , as the number of cores is increased from one to two, the inspection times of Phishing corpus and Phishload are increased by 21.01% to 148.27%, but the inspection time of Ham is decreased by VOLUME 6, 2018 46.74% to 63.91%. Furthermore, we observed similar results when the number of cores is increased from 1 to 3 shown in Table 6 . In this case, all the inspection times of Ham are decreased by 28.31% to 65.92%, whereas the inspection time of Phishing corpus is increased from 13.37% to 434.47% and the one of Phishload is increased from 55.84% to 253.54%. Generally speaking, increasing the number of cores from 2 to 3 increases the inspection time, as shown in Table 7 . When the number of cores is increased from 2 to 3, in Ham with the Rodney and Spoon regex detection, the increasing of the inspection time ranges from 4.18% to 81.98%, but with Gruber detection, the inspection time is decreased by −34.59%. In Phishing corpus, the inspection time increases from 115.28% to 141.09% for Gruber and Rodney but decreases 40.79% for Spoon. For Phishload, we observed that the inspection time increased 44.92% and 46.88% for Rodney and Spoon, respectively, but it decreased 33.66% for Gruber. We have noticed that Ham dataset is different from other two datasets because most of URLs of Ham are non-phishing. Thus, when increasing the cores, we expect that more data could be processed in the PhishLimiter. Since most URLs of Ham are legitimate, the cached result will speed up this process greatly. However, most URLs of Phishing corpus and Phishload are random phishing links so that the PhishLimiter has to spend much more time on DNS query and HTML content inspection. The fact reflects the above experimental results when we increase the number of cores. We could also observe the experiment results or the pattern in Figure 18 when you compare 1 core test cases 1, 4, and 7 with 2 cores test cases 2, 5, and 8 as well as 3 cores test cases 3, 6, and 9. In order to understand the pattern difference of inspection time for different datasets, we depict Figures 15, 16 , and 17 demonstrating how the inspection time is distributed. We found that test cases 1, 4, and 7 have less outliers than other test cases. From Table 2 , we know that test cases 1, 4, and 7 use 1 core only. Figures 15 and 16 show that the test cases with 2 cores and 3 cores have much more outliers than 1 core test cases. However, Figure 16 shows that the distribution patterns for all the cores are similar. We have further seen that in PhishCorpus and PhishLoad, adding the number of cores will increase the processing time, but the statement is not true for Ham. From Figures 15 and 16 , we have also observed that the inspection time is longer for all Spoon test cases 7, 8 and 9. Figure 18 gives a heat map for all test cases of all datasets. We take average of every 50 packets to reduce the total square numbers; thus, each square stands for the average of the nearby 50 packets. We observe the similar result in table 4 . As the color bar shows, the part in red stands for the case with a higher inspection time value. We can see that phish load has much more red values than other two datasets, indicating that Phishload dataset needs more inspection time. For Ham and Phish Corpus, most red squares are located in test cases 7, 8, and 9, which are Spoon detection regex. For Phishload, we can see that 2 cores and 3 cores with test cases, 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, and 9 have much more red squares.
Using PhishLimiter, we are able to thwart a threat varying on both inspection modes of SF and FI. The time needed to mitigate a threat, known as mitigation time, is critical to a security apparatus. Figure 13 and Table 3 present the mitigation time of PhishLimiter obtained from our extensive experiments on each dataset. As shown, the mitigation time was roughly 1.1 seconds or less. Although threat mitigation is key to thwarting threat actors and phishing attacks, the accuracy of detecting phishing attacks is critical to ensure where false positives and false negatives should be minimized. Moreover, these metrics are widely used to measure to the accuracy of an IDPS solution as well. Figure 19 gives a Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve derived from our extensive experiments where the relationship of false positives and true positives is presented. High the Area Under Curves (AUC) values are seen for both non-phishing and phishing classification results (AUC = 0.9934 in both cases). In these experiments, we use the proposed extractor to extract phishing features and apply an ANN model to build our classifier.
In Table 8 , we give the performance of each component of PhishLimiter. We find that the major test time is spent on VOLUME 6, 2018 Figure 20 (a). We have found that the ANN model is the slowest, whereas the J48 model is the fastest and it only needs 0.017ms. However, the performance overhead can be ignored because the ANN processing time only consists of 0.006% of the total URL inspection time. Because the ANN model provides the best accuracy as shown in Figure 4 , we choose the ANN model as our classification in the following evaluation.
Furthermore, we have extensively studied various ratios of ham to phishing for different real-world scenarios. Specifically, in the above ANN model, we have used 33% of UCI's phishing datasets [35] for test while the rest of the datasets was employed for training. To fully test the flexibility of our data, we mix phishing instances with normal (ham) instances with different ratios ranging from 10% to 90% phishing instances in cases of 6000, 12000, and 18000 URLs. Figures 21, 22, and 23 give the classification accuracy, AUC values of ROC curves, and false positive rates. These figures have shown that PhishLimiter has classification 
D. DISCUSSIONS
As seen in our experimental evaluation, the crypto module only adds the average of 0.6225 ms to inspect each URL in encrypted traffic. The overhead contributes to only 0.24% of the total processing time in Table 8 . PhishLimiter demonstrated the minimal inspection time needed to identify the intent of an SDN flow. We evaluated PhishLimiter using three detection approaches, Gruber, Spoon, and Rodney, to identify URLs within the payload of a packet. Our evaluation has shown that Gruber regex detection performed the most effective and efficient in comparison to Rodney and Spoon due to the minimal inspection time needed per URL. To be concise, the performance of each detection method has shown the complexity of datasets, Ham, Phishing Corpus, and Phishload where Spoon, Rodney and Gruber identify each URL at an average inspection time with time intervals: [52.1368ms, 194 .2071ms], [9.6918ms, 192 .8273 ms] and [3.2266 ms, 132.5652 ms], respectively. We also computed the mitigation time of PhishLimiter where we examined each dataset thoroughly to determine how the complexity of URLs and phishing attacks impacts on this mitigation time. We further calculated the overall average of mean values in Table 3 to get 0.7068 seconds, which is the overall averaged mitigation time once there was an alert.
False positives are prevalent in any detection system including PhishLimiter. When a message traverses through SF, a false positive can be detrimental to an end user due to the potentially valuable loss (drop) of an e-mail. The neural network used by PhishLimiter has been carefully fine-tuned and evaluated for accuracy, but can be haphazard to false positives, and therefore-a quarantine stage is necessary. The SF scheme for PhishLimiter drops messages that are identified with a likelihood of 95% probability, and can be modified by the administrator. Messages that have a lower probability value can be evaluated in the following procedures. Marking: The e-mail can be manipulated by PhishLimiter such that appropriate header information in the message shows an indication that the system has identified a potentially hazardous e-mail. This indication should be relatively obvious and blatant to an end user such that there are no confusion or visual impairments to such warning. Message Redirection: The message can be redirected to an independently isolated mailbox such that it requires an end user to retrieve the message securely. A notification message can be sent to an end user indicating that a message was redirected. One critical piece to the use of the Message Redirection technique is that a deeper inspection can be executed on attachment files to identify any malicious content such as malware. 
VI. RELATED WORK
Researchers have devoted to phishing attack using a variety of techniques including neural network and machine learning methods [1] - [3] , [43] - [49] . However, to the best of our knowledge, none of existing phishing detection algorithms is feasible to be used in the real world since they primarily have two major issues: (1) their detection rules are static that cannot be dynamically changed for dealing with the dynamics of phishing attacks in real time, and the incapability is usually found existing IDS such as SNORT [12] and BRO [13] , and (2) they require significantly long phishing detection and mitigation time. uses the programmability of SDN to direct traffic in SF and FI modes to deal with phishing dynamics and minimize detection and mitigation time, which cannot be done in a legacy network. It further utilizes the global view feature of an SDN network for better traffic management.
As noted, SDN has been used to detect and mitigate threats such as FloodGuard [50] , SPHINX [51] , an entropy-based solution [52] , and FlowGuard [53] . However, most of existing studies are not applicable to phishing attacks due to threat complexity and time-sensitive requirements. While serverbased and user-based techniques have been widely used to detect phishing attacks, to the best of our knowledge, we are the first to design an SDN-based phishing defending system. As for classification, PhishLimiter enables a machine learning-based phishing classifier with two-mode inspection techniques of DPI. Conducting DPI is difficult [54] and [55] . PhishLimiter develops a crypto module for this purpose. Mohammad et al. [56] pointed out that there is no single factor that can determine phishing. McGrath and Gupta [57] gave several important features in phishing URLs and discussed how a classification technique works based on phishing URL extractions. Likewise, phishing webpages usually claim a fake identity of other organizations. Thus, many algorithms [58] aim to extract the most important keyword on the page. CANTINA [47] deployed a keyword extraction algorithm that measures the frequency of a keyword. This keyword is used to compare to the elements of other part of html for abnormal detection [59] . As this research focuses on email phishing, we study anomaly in the URL, HTML and DNS database given in [56] .
In order to classify the feature set of URL and web pages, many researchers have studied a machine learning approach such as Support Vector Machine (SVM) [36] and Artificial Neural Networks (ANN) [38] . Basnet et al. [46] analyzed a set of phishing features and classified them with different machine learning algorithms including SVM, Biased support vector machine (BSVM), ANN, Scaled Conjugate Gradient Algorithm, Self Organizing Maps (SOMs), and K-Means. In this research, we also have made an extensive comparison of these techniques in order to find the best method for phishing feature extraction and classification. We have found that ANN has given the best accuracy in our testing. Thus, we focus on investigating ANN methods for this research.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
A phishing attack is a very common social engineering approach to targeting an organization and end users. It has become of the most harmful attacks nowadays. There have been numerous studies on detecting and mitigating phishing attacks. Traditional solutions focus on the use of inline inspection techniques such as an IPS or proxy service based on static string matching in traditional IDS such as SNORT and BRO. In this paper, we have proposed PhishLimiter as a new solution to thwart phishing attacks. PhishLimiter has the ability to handle network traffic dynamics for containing phishing attacks and can provide a better traffic management since it has a global view of networks due to SDN. Specifically, we have first classified phishing signatures by developing an ANN model using a PLS system. We then have built a trustworthy system for SDN traffic flow engineering by introducing PLS and the OVS switching score for SF and FI modes that can use the programmability of SDN to deal with the dynamics of phishing attacks in the real world. The trustworthy system has been achieved through our built crypto module for DPI through SSL/RSA encrypted traffic. Furthermore, we have theoretically and experimentally evaluate of PhishLimiter. We have evaluated the trustworthiness of each SDN flow to identify any potential hazards based on each deep packet inspection. Likewise, we have observed how the proposed inspection approach of two SF and FI modes within PhishLimiter detects and mitigates phishing attacks before reaching end users if the flow has been determined untrustworthy. Using our real-world experimental evaluation on GENI and phishing dataset, we have demonstrated that PhishLimiter is an effective and efficient solution to detect and mitigate phishing attacks with its accuracy of 98.39%.
